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An Appraisal of Attorneys'
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The author suggests that the Code of Professional Responsibility, formu-
lated for the trial bar, is inadequate as an ethical guide for administra-
tive practice. Employing securities and patent practice as examples, the
author illustrates how the nonadversary nature of administrative proceed-
ings and the important public interests affected therein dictate responsi-
bilities for administrative practitioners which differ from those of trial
attorneys. He concludes that a joint bar-agency committee should draft
a code of ethics covering the different types of administrative proceedings
and, perhaps, supplemental rules tailored to the unique proceedings of
particular agencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PHENOMENAL PROLIFERATION of administrative
agencies during the last few decades has resulted in a greater
percentage of the practicing bar devoting a substantial portion of its
effort to administrative law practice. While part of administrative
law practice is similar to trial practice before courts, much of the
practice involves nonadversary activities such as preparing docu-
ments for submission to administrative agencies for ex parte con-
sideration. The personal appearance of attorneys before agencies
is also often in a nonadversary role and frequently informal in na-
ture. The absence of an adversary check suggests the need for dif-
ferent and often higher ethical standards for attorneys involved in
these activities to insure that all information necessary for a deci-
sion, which is fair not only to the individual client but also to the
* Registered Patent Attorney; Professor of Law, Emory University School of
Law. B.A. (1954), J.D. (1960), University of Iowa; LL.M. (1963), University of
Michigan. Admitted to the Iowa, Michigan, and Georgia Bars.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
public, is placed before the administrative decisionmaker. In view
of the growth and sensitive nature of administrative law practice
(sensitive because of the vital public interests affected as a by-
product of determining the rights of a private litigant), it is sur-
prising that the bar's ethical concerns, as illustrated by the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility,' remain almost exclusively di-
rected at the trial attorney.
There is a growing appreciation of the redefinition of the attor-
ney's role and responsibilities in the administrative arena. The
agencies, themselves, are prime movers in the redefinition as can be
seen in the rules of conduct that are gradually emerging and in the
attempt by the agencies to hold attorneys liable for professional in-
competence and failure to carry out their new responsibilities. The
process is essentially piecemeal at this time. A set of core princi-
ples, such as a revised Code of Professional Responsibility, is need-
ed for reference, with specific refinements to be developed there-
from to meet different agency needs.
Administrative agencies can be classified into those that are en-
gaged in policing regulation and those that primarily confer rights or
economic benefit, although the latter may also police the recipients
of those benefits to varying degrees. Because of differences in the
professional functions of attorneys practicing before these two types
of agencies and their relationship to the agency, there are important
differences in matters of professional responsibility. Consequently,
ethical problems encountered in practice before each of the two types
of agencies are analyzed.
Securities regulation as conducted by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission is an example of the policing function. Be-
cause of the central role of the attorney in handling securities
matters and the economic stake often at issue, increased regulation
of attorneys' conduct by the SEC may be proper. Indeed, as will be
discussed, the SEC is moving in this direction, forcing attorneys to
recognize that competence and ethical conduct constitute duties
owed to the public.
Insight into the value of such regulation may be gained by exam-
ining the regulation of patent attorneys by the Patent Office, an agen-
cy that confers a substantial economic benefit. Patent practice was
chosen because it is a well-recognized specialty with an examination
required for admission2 and because the Patent Office enjoys a broad
congressional mandate to regulate the conduct of attorneys that
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1971).
2. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.341(a), (c) (1974).
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practice before it.3  With the increasing complexity of administra-
tive regulation of private activities, it is interesting to analyze a
"true" specialty to see whether it should serve as a model for other
areas of administrative law practice.
These two examples of administrative law practice are not so dif-
ferent from other examples in the same class of regulation as to cast
serious doubt upon the generality of the analysis, at least as to fed-
eral regulation.4 The analysis of practice before the two agencies
should aid in deciding whether canons for administrative law prac-
tice are needed and whether such canons should be on an agency-
by-agency basis or for all types of administrative law practice.
Coupling this analysis with a discussion of more general problem
areas in administrative law practice, such as ex parte communica-
tions, and trying to solve these problems by using the present trial-
oriented Code of Professional Responsibility indicate the inade-
quacy of the present Code in the administrative context. It is
beyond the scope of this article, however, to provide a complete new
code proposal or a system of ensuring professional competence in
specialized administrative fields. The purpose of this article is
served if it indicates the complexity of the problems, the difficulties
inherent in present guidelines, and some considerations for possible
resolution of the problems. Unless the bar takes the initiative in
dealing with the situation, it may find itself presented with a fait
accompli by the courts and the agencies.
II. SECURITIES PRACTICE
By joining two major law firms as defendants in SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp.,5 the SEC has raised several interesting
questions concerning the public responsibilities of attorneys engaged
in securities practice. These questions have yet to be answered as
6the court has only ruled on certain motions to date. The case
3. "The Commissioner ... may prescribe regulations governing the recogni-
tion and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or
other parties before the Patent Office . . . . "35 U.S.C. § 31 (1970).
4. There are a number of important differences between federal and state
regulation which may require some modification of the approach as to state regula-
tion.
5. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civil No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed
Feb. 3, 1972). For detailed discussions of the implications of the case, see Freeman,
Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DUKE L.J. 371, 412-33; Lowenfels, Ex-
panding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend
in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 412 (1974); Shipman,
The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys
Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIo ST. B.J. 231 (1973).
6. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
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against the law firms is premised upon their respective representa-
tion of two corporations in the consummation of a merger which
allegedly violated antifraud7 and reporting8 requirements of federal
securities law. There are two gravamens of the SEC's complaint.
First, the firms are charged with failing to refuse to issue their opin-
ions to each other, as required by the merger agreement, that all
client action required by law and all transactions involved in the
merger had been properly and validly taken. Second, the SEC al-
leges that the firms should have insisted upon a resolicitation of
the shareholders and a revision of a financial statement when they
learned, after approval of the merger by the shareholders, that the
original financial statement was inaccurate.9 If the corporate clients
should have refused resolicitation, the Commission expected counsel
to cease representing them and to notify the Commission of the mis-
leading financial statement. In addition, there are collateral charges
concerning the law firms' participation in their clients' fraudulent
schemes by rendering incomplete opinion letters as to the legality
of certain sales and assisting in the preparation of a false and mis-
leading annual report.
The Commission is seeking a permanent injunction against se-
curities violations by the law firms, which would make any future
violation subject to contempt of court. Granting the injunction
would also provide the Commission with grounds for disciplining
the attorneys which could result in disqualification to practice be-
fore the Commission.1° "
The SEC's complaint in National Student Marketing represents
a marked departure from past cases in that it is not alleged that the
lawyers were either principals or prime instigators in the scheme."
The court denied motions to dismiss on grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
7. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970) [hereinafter referred
to as "Securities Act"]; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970) [hereinafter referred to as "Exchange Act"].
8. Exchange Act §§ 13(a), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1970).
9. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. at 290.
10. The Commission . . . may by order temporarily suspend from ap-
pearing or practicing before it any attorney . . . or other professional
who . . . has been by name . . . [p]ermanently enjoined by any court of
competent jurisdiction by reason of his misconduct in an action brought by
the Commission from violation or aiding and abetting the violation of any
provision of the Federal securities laws.
17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974).
11. Prior to the commencement of this action judicial decisions imposing sanc-
tions against securities lawyers have been confined to fact situations involving an
attorney's participation as a principal or prime instigator in a fraudulent scheme.
See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, Mittle-
man v. United States, 368 U.S. 984 (1962) (affirmed judgment of conviction of attorney
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While the allegations are only based upon the lawyers' role as coun-
sel for the participants, one commentator has suggested that the
complaint appears to charge more active participation by counsel
than merely poor judgment.12 Although there is no suggestion that
the attorneys were the prime instigators or financially involved in
the transaction, it is alleged that they actively aided their clients in
perpetuating a fraudulent scheme. Certainly, the absence of par-
ticipation as a principal does not preclude a more active role than
merely rendering advice.
National Student Marketing appears to have set a new trend as
the Commission has subsequently filed several complaints against
attorneys alleging active aid in a client's fraudulent scheme. 3 While
all of these complaints are premised upon fraudulent participation
by attorneys, rather than negligence in advising clients, the Com-
mission is apparently attempting to shift some of its policing duty
of clients involved in securities transactions to their private counsel.
Counsel will not be permitted to stand silent behind the attorney-
client privilege while his client engages in actions which are fraudu-
lent under the securities laws. At a minimum, the attorney cannot
bless these actions with his opinion. A practical effect of forcing an
attorney to cease representing his client and to notify the SEC if the
client refuses to correct his fraudulent practices is that the client will
be more responsive to advice from his attorney that he comply with
the securities laws. In this manner, the securities attorney may be-
come an officer of the Commission, perhaps to a greater extent than
attorneys are officers of the court. The additional "officers" would
certainly ease the enforcement task of the Commission. And the with-
drawal requirement alone would not seem to harm the attorney-
client relationship; indeed, it may enhance the sagging respect for
the bar. The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has advo-
based on personal participation). Administrative decisions suspending or dis-
qualifying attorneys from practice before the SEC have been based upon similar
participation. See, e.g., Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347 (1960), modified,
40 S.E.C. 459 (1961) (Commission accepted the attorney's consent to permanent
disqualification from practice before the SEC based upon both participation as a
principal and flagrant conduct as an attorney in a number of securities violations).
However, the Commission's regulations provide that it may disqualify an attorney for
unethical conduct that is purely professional in nature. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii)
(1974).
12. Lowenfels, supra note 5, at 421.
13. See, e.g., SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,183 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1973) [motion granted compelling SEC
to make available to defendant investigative transcripts of testimony of any witness
whose deposition is to be taken]; SEC v. R.D. Philpot Indus., Inc., Civil No. 73-543
(S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 5, 1973).
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cated withdrawal in an analogous situation where a client refuses to
correct a misrepresentation made to the Internal Revenue Service.'
4
At first blush, the establishment of the additional duty to report
does not appear to endanger the attorney-client relationship since
clients would seldom proceed with a plan in the face of a threat of
report. However, a closer examination reveals that the relationship
may be harmed due to reticence of management to disclose all facts
to their attorney, which is essential to effective representation.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility may provide some
guidance in the resolution of this problem by its requirement that an
attorney receiving information which clearly establishes that his
client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal must report it if the
client refuses to do so.15  But this general ethical principle is very
difficult to apply to specific securities situations. This difficulty is evi-
dent in the National Student Marketing case but the difficulty is even
greater when attempting to apply the principle to answer the ques-
tions heretofore left unanswered by the courts. For example, courts
have not indicated whether they would impose a reporting obligation
where the attorney may only have reason to suspect a violation or
where there is doubt as to whether or not the facts constitute a vio-
lation. Under these circumstances, the attorney should have the
duty at least to investigate his client's statements which he has
reason to believe may be false. Certainly, he has a duty to be more
than a blind scrivener in preparing false statements for circulation to
potential investors." An obligation to check a client's statements
where easily verifiable was suggested in Escott v. Bar Chris Con-
struction Corp.,17 even though counsel was found to be liable to the
investors only in his role as a director of the corporation.
On the other hand, the attorney should not have to investigate
every possible impropriety in his client's statement, as this would
make securities practice impossible. If this approach were pushed
to its logical extreme, securities attorneys might need to undertake
an independent investigation, including a financial audit, to deter-
mine the accuracy and completeness of facts disclosed by individual
14. "If ... the lawyer believes that the service relies on him as corroborating
statements of his client which he knows to be false, then he is under a duty to dis-
associate himself from any such reliance." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965).
15. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)
(1), at 360 (1975). The interpretation of this amended rule has been the subject of
much controversy as to whether it allows the dissemination of privileged information
when the attorney feels it is necessary, or whether it prohibits such communication
in all instances.
16. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968) (dictum).
17. 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dictum).
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clients. Fortunately, the duty to investigate facts which may lead to a
reporting requirement has not been pushed to this extreme. While
a lawyer who consents to the use of his opinion on a technical mat-
ter, such as probable patent or tax results filed with a registration
statement, probably has a duty as an "expert" to conduct a reasonable
investigation of the facts,18 this obligation only extends to facts upon
which his opinion is based and not other facts in the registration
statement. Unless he is such an "expert," there is, in general, no
duty to conduct a reasonable investigation and the attorney is prob-
ably not liable to purchasers under the Securities Act (although he
might be liable for common law malpractice in certain instances).
Under the Securities Act, this result seems to be inconsistent with the
express duty of directors and accountants to conduct a reasonable
investigation of the unexpertised portions of the registration state-
ment,1 9 especially in light of the securities attorney's extensive
participation in drafting a registration statement. Nevertheless,
there is no indication that the Commission plans to impose an in-
dependent investigation requirement upon securities attorneys in
a role other than as "experts," except as to matters where there is
reason to suspect the inaccuracy of a client's statements and a verifi-
cation is relatively easy to make. Even this extension would signifi-
cantly increase the client's expense for securities work.
In addition to the fraud exception to the general rule forbidding
disclosures of a client's confidences, another ethical principle might
be applied in the securities area. But it, too, is difficult to apply in the
administrative context. The Code of Professional Responsibility
permits disclosure of a client's confidences to prevent the commis-
sion of a crime.20  As the goal of this ethical obligation is crime pre-
vention, it would seem that the attorney should inform his client before
reporting, which in itself is likely to prevent the crime from being
committed. For the same reason, attorneys should not be obligated
to report confidences that do not contemplate the commission of a
18. "In case any part of the registration statement ... contained an un-
true statement ... any person acquiring such security ... may...
sue . . . every . . . person whose profession gives authority to a state-
ment made by him .... No person, other than the issuer, shall be liable
... who shall sustain the burden of proof ... [that] as regards any part
of the registration statement purporting to be made upon his authority
as an expert . . . he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground
to believe ... that the statements therein were true .... "
Securities Act §§ I (a)(4), I l(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(4), 77k(b)(3)(B) (1970).
19. Id. §§ ll(a)(2), (4), (b)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(2)(4), (b)(3).
20. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Disciplinary Rule
4-101(c)(3), at 17 (1971). Disclosure is mandatory if "the facts in the attorney's
possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed."
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965).
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crime. If the reporting obligation were to be extended to situations
other than the planning of crimes, the weakening of the confidential
obligation would be detrimental to effective representation, which is
a high price to pay for ease in enforcement. The primary duty of the
securities attorney should remain to his client and not the
Commission.
On the other hand, the Commission and the public should be
able to rely upon the integrity and forthrightness of the securities
attorney. By holding themselves out in a manner to encourage in-
vestor reliance, as when they know investors will receive and rely
upon their opinions, attorneys may assume a greater responsibility
to investors which must be taken into account in reconciling the con-
fidence and reporting obligations. Imposing a greater responsibil-
ity is especially appropriate because of the central position of the
securities attorney in the investment process and the limited ability
of the Commission to determine the accuracy of statements filed
within the predominatly nonadversary proceedings.21 Thus, it may
be justifiable to hold the securities attorney to a higher ethical stand-
ard than his colleagues practicing in other areas.
Clearly, the courts and the SEC are attempting to thrust an ill-
defined reporting obligation on the securities bar to enlist its aid in
the policing function. That obligation must be claiified. The role
of the attorney and the function of the agency must be taken into ac-
count in establishing any reporting obligation. As a general rule,
the lowest reporting obligation should be imposed when the Com-
mission is in an adequate position to discover the facts indepen-
dently and the obligation is likely to be most harmful to the attorney-
client relationship. The traditional adversary role where the
Commission is functioning as a prosecutor and counsel is defending
his client fits these criteria. A greater reporting obligation may be
in order when counsel is assisting a client in preparing registration
statements or other documents for ex parte filing with the Com-
mission since these are not examined in an adversary setting.
Ethical conduct has not been the only area of administrative
practice with which the SEC has concerned itself. The competence
of the securities bar is receiving increased attention. Without wait-
ing for a decision on its attempt to hold attorneys accountable for
aiding a fraudulent scheme, the Commission has endeavored by fil-
ing two complaints to hold attorneys accountable for negligence in
21. These points were stressed in Emanuel Fields, [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,407, at 83,174 n.20 (SEC 1973), rejecting an argument
that the Commission lacked authority to disqualify an attorney from practice before
the Commission.
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rendering opinions to clients.22 These complaints allege that the
attorneys knew or should have known that their clients were not en-
titled to an exemption as they stated in an opinion letter. The com-
plaints represent a marked departure from the traditional rule that
the attorney is liable only to his client for negligence. Imposing
negligence accountability upon attorneys would greatly increase the
Commission's control over the securities bar, especially in view of
the threat of the drastic sanction of disqualification from practice.
If attorneys are to be disqualified on negligence grounds, the Com-
mission should endeavor to minimize the incidence of negligence by
admitting attorneys only by examination as is done by the Patent
Office. 2' This may be justifiable in view of the complexities of secu-
rities practice. Possibly, the Commission is attempting to assert
greater control over the securities bar in an effort to restore investor
confidence in the sagging securities market. This tack may have
been necessary because self-regulation of the securities area by the
bar has not been very effective. While vigorous self-regulation is
perhaps contrary to human nature, deficiencies in self-regulation are
likely to result in overcorrection by the administrative agencies.
At this point it is worthwhile to ask if this drastic overhaul of the
attorneys responsibilities in the securities field is justified by a ben-
efit to be gained by the general public. Some economists who
have studied the activities of the Commission have concluded that in-
vestors have not greatly benefited from the regulatory effort2 4 which
is designed to reduce investor ignorance, a goal often forgotten by
the Commission in its concentration upon the technicalities of regu-
lation. The Commission may have believed that its impact would
be increased by placing some of the enforcement responsibility upon
attorneys. As in the case of the direct regulation of prime movers,
any expansion of regulation should be analyzed in terms of econom-
ic costs and benefits.
As pointed out by Professor Demsetz, the rate of return of in-
vesting in securities regulation is the "present value of the stream of
future benefits minus future costs, all divided by the initial invest-
22. SEC v. R.D. Philpot Indus., Inc., Civil No. 73-543 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 5,
1973); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., Civil No. 73-362 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Aug. 21, 1973), motion to dismiss denied [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 94,212 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1973).
23. The current Rules of Practice permit representation by any attorney ad-
mitted to practice in any state or the District of Columbia. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(b)
(1974).
24. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. Bus. 117, 129
(1964).
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ment requirement. 25  Regulation is worthwhile if the expected rate
of return at least equals the expected rate from employing the re-
source elsewhere. 26 Information dissemination is a complex activ-
ity to control because of the difficulty of ascertaining what
information gives investors an accurate account of the value of an
investment. For this reason it is to be expected that the cost of
regulation will be high relative to the rate of return. A comparison
of the large sums spent by investors to uncover worthwhile business
information with the meager resources of the Commission suggests
that regulation only increases the useful information slightly. Im-
posing a part of the enforcement responsibility on the private se-
curities bar may reduce the Commission's cost of regulation, but it
is difficult to see how it is likely to increase greatly the useful infor-
mation for the investing public. The inherent difficulty of regulating
information dissemination is even greater in this situation because
attorneys are specially trained to avoid such controls. Under this
approach, attorneys' opinions on securities and drafts of stock pro-
spectuses may contain even more hedging language than at present.
While complete knowledge by investors is essential to achieving per-
fect competition, not only is the cost of increasing the knowledge
high, but perfect competition would not be attainable in any event as
it is only a theoretical tool of economics.
The Commission has responded to the conclusion that its regu-
lation is not very effective by expanding its regulation, which is the
typical response of a regulatory agency. Agencies rarely ask
whether it may be desirable to decrease the amount of regulation.
While the value of the SEC attempt to enlist securities attorneys
in its police force at the expense of traditional attorney-client re-
lationships may be questioned, the existence of the attempt may
not. It remains to be seen whether the federal courts will accede to
the desire of the Commission to expand its control over the
securities bar.
In any event, the inadequacies of the present Code of Professional
Responsibility in the securities area when called upon to solve the
problems raised by the SEC in the reporting area are manifest.
Similarly, the bar has failed to consider the Commission's legitimate
concerns with professional competence in this intricate area. The
SEC has shown no reluctance to force the issue in the courts despite
the possible lack of any real gain to the investing public and the
25. Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in Eco-
NOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 1, 4 (H. Manne
ed. 1969).
26. Id.
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countervailing costs. Surely the bar itself should weigh these con-
siderations and provide guidance to practitioners before other
bodies develop concrete rules without bar input.
III. PATENT PRACTICE
Any attorney in good standing is permitted to represent clients
before nearly all administrative agencies. 27  A unique aspect of pat-
ent practice is that a bar-type examination administered by the
Patent Office must be passed in order to prepare and prosecute
patent applications for others. 28  Another indication that patent
practice is a true specialty is the fact that the United States permits
patent attorneys licensed in foreign countries to represent appli-
cants from such countries.29 In recognition of the importance of a
scientific background, admission to practice is not restricted to at-
torneys; any citizen with the necessary scientific qualifications is
also permitted to take the patent examination.30 Nonlawyers are
admitted under the label of patent agent, but are permitted to prac-
tice before the Patent Office to the same extent as a patent attorney.3'
Although the minimum scientific qualifications are not con-
tained in its regulations, 32 the Patent Office requires that an appli-
cant for registration as a patent agent have a degree in engineering or
physical science or have served a long apprenticeship under a patent
practitioner.33  An applicant for registration as a patent attorney
must have some scientific training, but not to the same degree as
that required of patent agents.
27. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500(b), (e) (1970) (applicable to all federal agencies except
Patent Office with respect to patent matters).
28. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341(c) (1974). The examination may be waived for anyone
who has served for four years as an examiner in the Patent Office. Any attorney in
good standing may represent clients in trademark matters before the Patent Office
without taking an examination. Id. § 2.12 (1974).
29. On the basis of reciprocity, the U.S. Patent Office will register foreign
patent attorneys to represent applicants from their country. Id. § 1.341(e) (1974).
30. "Any citizen of the United States not an attorney at law who fulfills the
requirements and complies with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to
practice before the Patent Office." Id. § 1.341(b) (1974).
31. Id.
32. The only scientific qualification stated is that the applicant must "establish
to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is . . . possessed of the legal and
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants
for patents valuable service . . . . " Id. § 1.341(c) (1974).
33. Cf. Gager v. Ladd, 212 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
936 (1964). The court upheld the Patent Office's denial of admission to examination
by a person seeking registration as a patent agent on grounds of lack of a scientific
degree. The Patent Office allows credit of one year toward a degree for each two
years of apprenticeship. Id. at 674.
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This power to decide who will practice before it, not enjoyed by
other agencies such as the SEC, vests the Patent Office with a unique
opportunity to ensure that all patent practitioners are competent. As
discussed previously, the SEC has resorted to negligence actions in
the courts to achieve the same goal. But the Patent Office has not
exercised the full extent of competency screening power it has avail-
able. Once an applicant is admitted to practice as a patent attor-
ney or agent, he is permitted to prepare and prosecute applications
in any technical field regardless of his lack of training in that field.34
Thus, a patent attorney with training in mechanical engineering is
permitted to prepare chemical patent applications even though he
has never had a course in chemistry. Within patent practice the
technical fields of chemical, electrical and mechanical practice are
well recognized. If the Patent Office wished to afford complete pro-
tection to the public from incompetent practitioners, an examina-
tion should be required for each technical field allowing only those
who have passed the examination to practice in that field. Fortu-
nately, the problem is only of slight significance since most patent
practitioners recognize their limitations and do not venture too far
out of their technical field.
Even without additional safeguards, the existing patent exam-
ination-which tests the applicant's knowledge of patent law and his
practice skills, especially the intricacies of claim drafting-is also a
substantial market restriction. It is very difficult to pass the exam-
ination unless practice skills have been acquired by a brief appren-
ticeship with an experienced practitioner. Admittedly, these
restrictions serve to bar some who are unqualified, but as with all
such restrictions, those who are admitted are able to charge higher
fees than they could with greater competition. Given the technical
and legal complexities involved in procuring a patent, an examina-
tion of practice qualifications is undoubtedly necessary. The Patent
Office is justified in screening out incompetents by its examination.
However, it must be mindful of the market-restricting effect and,
perhaps, could ameliorate this effect by simplifying patent proce-
dure and claims writing so that practice admission qualifications
could be lowered.
Unlike most agencies, the Patent Office has the specific statutory
authority to promulgate detailed rules regulating the conduct of patent
practitioners.35 Unfortunately the only specific rule it has promul-
34. The regulations provide no further restrictions after the applicant has passed
the examination. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (1974).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1970).
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gated is a ban against advertising, 6 which is quite similar to the ban
applicable to attorneys in general.3 7 Like the entrance examination,
this rule has the undesirable side effect of market restriction. Both
price theory38 and several empirical studies39 support the contention
that advertising makes markets more competitive, resulting in
lower prices to consumers. The advertising ban makes entry into
patent practice more costly and difficult, 40 which serves to benefit the
well-established patent firms. Given the support of the organized
bar for the advertising ban4 ' and the dual regulation of the conduct
of patent attorneys by state bars and the Patent Office, 2 however, it
36. "The use of advertising . . . to solicit patent business . . . is forbidden as
unprofessional conduct, and any person engaging in such solicitation . . . shall be
refused recognition to practice before the Patent Office or may be suspended, ex-
cluded or disbarred from further practice." 37 C.F.R. § 1.345 (1974).
37. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rules 2-101, 2-102
at 7 (1971).
38. Demsetz, Do Competition and Monopolistic Competition Differ?, 76 J. POL.
EcoN. 146 (1968); Demsetz, The Nature of Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition,
67 J. POL. ECON. 21 (1959).
39. See, e.g., Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses,
15 J. LAW & ECON. 337 (1972); Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, 1 J. LAW
& ECON. 20, 43-44 (1958). Professor Benham found that the price of eyeglasses
averaged S37.48 in states where advertising was banned and $17.98 in states with
no restriction on advertising. Benham, supra, at 342 (Table 1).
40. Without advertising, firms have to resort to more expensive ways of finding
customers which increases the costs of entry. Attorneys find clients by member-
ship in country clubs, involvement in public activities and politics, and through
friends. All of these activities may be more costly than advertising.
41. A principal justification given for the advertising ban is that it is designed
to insure quality service. It is contended that clients might select attorneys more
adept in advertising for clients than in representing them. L. PATTERSON &
E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 358 (1971). The author has not seen any
empirical studies that support the contention. Assuming the contention is correct,
an argument can be developed that automobile mechanics should not be permitted
to advertise because of the importance of the quality of their repair work to our very
lives. It is also logical to extend the argument to goods as well since services are
involved in their manufacture and distribution. See generally Comment, A Critical
Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L. RaV. 674 (1958);
Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REV. 677 (1954).
The Canons of Ethics (predecessor of the Code of Professional Responsibility) have
been broadly attacked as fostering a guild system and favoring large, well-established
law firms. Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a
Group Moral Code, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 244 (1968).
42. In Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the Court held that, by virtue of
the supremacy clause, a state may not enforce licensing requirements for practice
before the Patent Office in addition to those established by the Office. The Court
vacated an injunction restraining a nonlawyer patent practitioner registered in the
Patent Office from representing Florida clients before the office. While the Patent
Office demands that both patent attorneys and agents conform to the
standards of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, see note 43, infra, the
Sperry case does not prevent a state from enforcing the Disciplinary Rules against
patent attorneys. However, the states do not have jurisdiction over patent agents
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is probably not feasible for the Patent Office to repeal the adver-
tising ban.
Instead of tailoring its own rules of conduct to its specific situa-
tion, the Patent Office has chosen to adopt the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility43  which was shown inadequate in the
securities regulation field. There have not been many disbarment
or suspension cases instituted by the Patent Office. The dearth of
cases may be due to patent practitioners observing high ethical
standards or inadequate policing by the Patent Office. Another
plausible explanation is that fewer ethical problems are encountered
in patent practice before the Patent Office because much of the work
involves dealing with objective scientific facts where any deception
is likely to be discovered quickly.
Nevertheless, one of the few disbarment cases instituted reached
the Supreme Court. The Court, in Kingsland v. Dorsey,4 upheld
the disbarment of a patent attorney by the Commissioner of Patents
for deceiving the Patent Office as to the real authority of an article
he cited to support a patent application and representing it as the
work of a reluctant witness. The later suppression of the deception
in litigation, 45 which ultimately led to the patent being held unen-
forceable by the attorney's corporate client, may have been the deci-
sive factor in the imposition of the harsh penalty for what was essen-
tially ghostwriting. Holding this type of ghostwriting unethical
seems to be inconsistent with treating the ghostwriting of affidavits
by attorneys as proper. The different treatment can be explained by
the fact that a tribunal is not deceived when an attorney assists in
the drafting of an affidavit as such assistance is commonly expected.
However, it is not commonly expected that an article praising the
ingenuity of an invention and published under the name of a labor
leader is ghostwritten by the patent attorney. Nevertheless, the
penalty seems a little harsh in that the article was apparently not a
factual account but rather an expression of opinion which is not of
great probative value on the issue of inventiveness. Of course, if
the attorney participated in or was aware of later suppression of
as they are not licensed by the states. The state regulation of patent attorneys is
exclusive as to functions not within the scope of practice authorized by the Patent
Office, such as preparation of infringement opinions. See Sperry v. Florida, supra,
at 403 n.47.
43. "Attorneys and agents appearing before the patent office must conform to
the standards of ethical and professional conduct set forth in the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility of the American Bar Association ...... 37 C.F.R. § 1.344
(1974).
44. 338 U.S. 318 (1949).
45. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
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these facts by his corporate client, he clearly had a duty to report it to
the court if his client refused to do so.46 The Court went beyond the
facts of the case in endorsing the view of the Patent Office Commit-
tee on Enrollment and Disbarment that the "highest degree of
candor and good faith" is required of attorneys in patent prosecu-
tion because of the nature of the patent application.4 7
When applications are made in the patent field, as in the securi-
ties field, the client or practitioner often possesses extensive
information concerning the subject of that application. Relevant
facts which may be within the client's or practitioner's knowledge
include public use or sale of the invention more than one year before
the application date,48 publication of the invention more than one
year before the application date,49 prior invention by someone else,5 °
premature or unlicensed filing of a foreign application,5 and mis-
joinder of inventors. 2 The information, if brought to the attention
of the Patent Office, might materially affect the decision of whether
to grant the patent. The failure to disclose information of this type
may lead to the issuance of an invalid patent which accords the pat-
entee a monopoly to which he is not entitled.
Some of these facts, such as public use or sale, are more likely to
be within the client's personal knowledge, but other facts, such as
premature or unlicensed filing of a foreign application might also
be known by the patent practitioner. Knowledge of prior patents
which are relevant references against the application may only be
obtained by the practitioner as a result of a thorough patent search.
The existence of fraud in the procurement of a patent presents
the clearest instance of breach of duty in this specialized field.
Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Mainte-
nance Machinery Co. 5 3 established "an uncompromising duty" on
anyone with a pending application to report to the Patent Office all
facts concerning possible fraud involving his application because of
the public interest in the economic consequences of patents. While
the setting aside of a patent because of fraud requires clear and con-
vincing evidence,54 a breach of this reporting duty when fraud may
46. This is now expressly required by ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSI-
BILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(b) (1971).
47. 338 U.S. at 319.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 102(g).
51. Id. §§ 102(b), (d), 185 (1970).
52. Id. § 256 (1970).
53. 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945).
54. Cf. Helms Prod. v. Lake Shore Mfg. Co., 227 F.2d 677, 680 (7th Cir.
1955).
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be involved renders the patent unenforceable under the unclean
hands doctrine and obligates the patent owner to pay the challenger's
attorneys' fees,55 and may lead to the disbarment of the offending
attorney. 56  In addition, enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud
can result in antitrust liability57 because of the concomitant restraint
of trade.
Breach of the reporting duty is less clear-cut when it is based
on a failure to cite similar prior art. The presumption of validity
which attaches to patents58 is destroyed or weakened when the pa-
tent's validity is attacked on grounds of prior art not cited by the
Patent Office. 59 The patent practitioner has an ethical obligation to
cite pertinent prior art which is analogous to the attorney's ethical
obligation to cite contrary authority.60  Since the attorney's obliga-
tion to cite contrary authority is set forth in an Ethical Considera-
tion rather than in a Disciplinary Rule, it is aspirational in character
rather than mandatory.6 1 Consequently, the rule's effect is like that
of a rule of manners; the bench and bar may frown upon its breach
but are unlikely to take legal action.
Just as there is some dispute concerning the ethical responsi-
bility to cite noncontrolling authority,62 there is conflict over the
obligation to disclose prior art which is not anticipatory but which
might be pertinent to the obviousness issue. The ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility imposes only the ethical obligation to
cite directly adverse legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction.63
Imposition of an ethical obligation to cite authority that is either not
directly adverse, but nevertheless somewhat relevant, or from a non-
controlling jurisdiction may undermine the attorney's role as an ad-
vocate by detracting from the force of his argument. In a sense,
such a requirement would make the attorney a representative of
both sides of a controversy. Extensive citation of authority which is
55. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1970); see, e.g., Shelco, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 466 F.2d
613, 618 (Ith Cir. 1972).
56. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Whitaker, 42 Ohio St. 2d 1, 325 N.E. 2d 889
(1975).
57. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1970).
59. Shelco, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 322 F. Supp. 485, 517 (N.D. Ill. 1970),
aff'd, 466 F.2d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 1972).
60. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-23, at 26
(1971).
61. Id. at 1.
62. See Tunstall, Ethics in Citation: A Plea for Re-Interpretation of a Canon,
35 A.B.A.J. 5 (1949).
63. Ethical Consideration 7-23, supra note 60, at 26.
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merely persuasive can result in confusion and hamper careful scru-
tiny by the bench of what is actually the most relevant authority.
Indeed, some overtaxed judges would not welcome such extensive
displays of learning. Certainly, an attorney is obligated to respond
with candor to requests from the bench concerning noncontrolling
authority, but the desirability of a rule imposing a duty to volunteer
such authority must be balanced with the attorney's role as his
client's advocate.
The same considerations raised above are also relevant to the
patent practitioner's obligation to cite prior art. It may be justifiable,
however, to impose a greater obligation upon the patent practi-
tioner. This greater obligation arises because patent prosecution is
basically an ex parte process. Even though the examiner assumes a
quasi-adversary role, his role as decisionmaker prevents him from
being the equivalent of an aggressive opposing counsel who is direct-
ly affected by the outcome. In order to protect the public interest
it is essential to impose a higher obligation upon the attorney when
there is no opponent and when the tribunal has less control over the
attorney than does a court. Unfortunately, the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility is primarily directed at the advocate whose
activities are examined by his opponent and controlled by a court. 4
The circumstances under which there is a duty to disclose prior
art in a patent proceeding have been subject to some judicial
scrutiny. The Seventh Circuit, in Wen Products, Inc. v. Portable
Electric Tools, Inc.,65 held there was no obligation to disclose prior
art that did not embody the inventions in the disputed claims. On
the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, in Beckman Instruments, Inc. v.
Chemtronics, Inc.,6 6 indicated that it is the applicant's uncompro-
mising duty to disclose any close prior art to the Patent Office. The
Beckman court reasoned that the determination of whether the prior
art renders the invention obvious should be left to the Patent Office
rather than to the judgment of the applicant. The court empha-
sized that the Patent Office did not have its own research facilities
64. See Thode, The Ethical Standard of the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REv. 575,
578-79 (1961).
65. 367 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1966). The court quoted the opinion of a district court
with approval:
"There has been no showing that under any statute, or rule of the Patent Office, or
professional custom, or canon of ethics there is any explicit or implicit obligation
resting upon an applicant for a patent or his solicitor to disclose to the Patent Office
all the material which he has used in evolving the invention he claims."
Id. at 767, citing United States .v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949,
952 (D. Mass. 1957), appeal dismissed, 254 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1958).
66. 428 F.2d 555, 566 (5th Cir. 1970). The prior art in this case was nearly
identical to the invention claimed. Id. at 562-64.
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
and that the patent prosecution process could not function properly
as an "arm's length" adversary proceeding.67
The Beckman approach raises a question of how close the prior
art must be before there is a duty to disclose. A committee ap-
pointed by the National Council of Patent Law Associations, in con-
junction with a corresponding committee appointed by the Commis-
sioner of Patents, has formulated Proposed Guidelines Respecting
Conduct Before the Patent Office which attempt to answer this ques-
tion.68 These guidelines impose an obligation upon the inventor
and his counsel to disclose "prior art which has not been cited by
the Examiner, provided [the inventor or his counsel] then has actual
knowledge of the prior art and he recognizes that it should be con-
sidered in determining whether a claim in a patent application" is
non-obvious. 69 The guidelines do not indicate whether or not the
obligation is to be. mandatory, but their wording suggests that they
are only aspirational.
Since the relevant prior art is most frequently discovered in a
patentability search conducted by the patent practitioner prior to
filing an application, it can be argued that this proposed standard
may have an adverse impact upon the quality of applications be-
cause some practitioners will be discouraged from conducting
searches for fear of finding relevant prior art. The main infir-
mity in this argument is that most practitioners are aware that the
examiner is likely to find the prior art in his own search and that
the prospect of drafting an allowable application is enhanced by
conducting a thorough search. Nevertheless, the guidelines could
penalize the thorough patent practitioner, and do not consider the
problem of the less thorough practitioner.
One way to eliminate this unequal treatment would be to require
that a patent search be conducted before the application is filed
with the results of the search to be disclosed to the Patent Office.
The two main difficulties with such an approach are that it would be
difficult to develop and apply uniform standards for searches and the
costs of patent prosecution would be increased to the detriment of
the poorly financed inventor. It can also be argued that no affirmative
disclosure obligation should be imposed as the prior art is equally
accessible to the practitioner and the examiner. But it must be
67. Id. at 564-65.
68. Report from W. Hulbert, Chairman, to the National Council of Patent Law
Associations, Nov. 20, 1970, in Guidelines Respecting Conduct Before Patent Office,
1970 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N BULL. 640 [hereinafter referred to as Guidelines]. Formal
adoption of these guidelines by the Patent Office was apparently considered, but no
action has yet been taken.
69. Id. at 641 (Guideline No. 4).
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realized that due to the difficulty of conducting a patent search and
given the application load, an examiner will not always find the
most relevant prior art. Since this is not a true adversary process,
it does not seem unfair to impose a disclosure obligation upon the
practitioner in order to protect the public interest.
Unfortunately, the substance of the proposed guidelines is inade-
quate for the patent practitioner to ascertain which prior art should
be brought to the attention of the examiner. This failure to develop
an informative standard will create considerable uncertainty among
practitioners about the scope of their obligation. Since the easiest
standard to apply, one limiting the disclosure obligation to prior
art that was directly anticipatory, would make the disclosure obliga-
tion virtually meaningless (prior art generally is not directly antici-
patory), a higher but more difficult-to-apply standard is required.
One means of reducing the confusion would be to supplement the
standards with examples similar to those found in the Treasury
Regulations of the Internal Revenue Code.
Although prior art may be equally accessible to the patent prac-
titioner and examiner, certain disqualifying facts, such as a statutory
bar like public use,70 may not be so readily discoverable by the
Patent Office. The client is only penalized for failure to disclose the
facts by being required to pay challenger's attorneys fees if such
failure is held to be fraudulent.71 Since the patent can be held in-
valid solely upon the basis of the statutory bar, until the statutory
bar is established, which may never occur, the patent owner enjoys
the full patent reward. The proposed guidelines prohibit a patent
practitioner from filing or maintaining a claim in a patent applica-
tion "which he actually knows to be unpatentable because of any
statutory bar., 72  Even without these guidelines, a patent practi-
tioner is subject to being disciplined by the Patent Office under these
circumstances. 73  The guidelines do not directly answer the interest-
ing issue of whether there is an obligation to disclose facts74 which
the patent practitioner should recognize that the examiner might
consider as raising an issue of statutory bar.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
71. The inventor could be prosecuted for a false swearing on his oath accompany-
ing the patent application, but this is rarely done. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970).
72. Guidelines 641 (No. 3).
73. Patent attorneys and agents are required to conform to the standards of
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
74. The patent attorney may decide that the facts do not constitute a statutory
bar. In a close case the examiner may reach the opposite conclusion. For example,
as to the public use bar there may be a close question as to "experimental use."
See Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1878).
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Such a disclosure obligation may be implied from the proposed
guidelines which recognize the right of the patent practitioner to ad-
vocate in good faith "the patentability of a claim if he believes the
reasons asserted."7 5  Clearly, there should be a higher standard of
disclosure in this case than with prior art which is readily available
to the examiner. Indeed, the determination of whether an issue of
statutory bar ought to be raised should be made by the examiner
and not preempted by the patent practitioner.
The nonadversary nature of most patent practice16 and the pecu-
liar problems encountered therein strongly suggest the need for more
detailed ethical rules to govern patent practitioners. As is presently
being done in the securities area, a greater obligation to the admin-
istrative agency could be imposed upon the patent practitioner in
order to enlist his aid in screening patent applications. No doubt
the efficiency of the Patent Office could be improved by this course
of action, but the improvement would be at the expense of the im-
portant attorney-client relationship. In the long run, the imposition
of such an obligation could be self-defeating, as clients might with-
hold possibly invalidating information from their attorneys as was
previously suggested in discussion of the securities arena. In adopt-
ing detailed standards for patent practitioners, it should be borne in
mind that the public does not rely upon their statements to the ex-
tent that they rely on the statements of securities attorneys. Per-
haps, therefore, the protection of the public interest does not require
as much from a patent attorney as it does from a securities special-
ist.
IV. CANONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility is largely directed
at the trial attorney whether he is before a court or in a comparable
adjudicative proceeding before an administrative agency. But as
presently constituted, the Code demands that attorneys follow the
same standard of conduct in nonadjudicative settings. Although it
recognizes the variety of administrative proceedings,77 the Code
does not enunciate tailor-made rules for nonadjudicative proceed-
75. Guidelines 641 (No. 3).
76. Appeals to the Board of Appeals in the Patent Office are adversary in that
the government is represented by the Office of Solicitor within the Patent Office.
Interference proceedings, which are priority contests between two persons claiming
the same invention, are also adversary. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1970).
77. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-15,
at 25 (1971).
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ings. The analysis of securities and patent practice illustrates the
need for such special rules.
The Code's sweeping prohibition of ex parte communications
by a lawyer on the merits of his case with the judge or the decision-
maker in an administrative agency is an example of its emphasis on
the courtroom attorney. The prohibition is more applicable to ad-
versary proceedings78 and the Code fails to delineate guidelines
for the more difficult problem of ex parte communications in non-
adversary proceedings such as rulemaking.
Numerous bills were introduced in Congress between 1957 and
1961 to regulate ex parte communications with administrative agen-
cies.79  Legislative concern abated as many agencies adopted their
own rules to discourage ex parte communications, usually accomp-
lished by denying what the communicator was seeking.80 Disclo-
sure of those communications that were made enabled adverse
parties to assert their positions more effectively. Both the federal
Administrative Procedure Acts ' and Model State Administrative
Procedure Act S2 contain provisions prohibiting administrative agen-
cies from making certain types of ex parte communications.8 3  It is
unfortunate that there is no similar code of administrative practice
to regulate the ethical conduct of representatives practicing before
agencies.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not define the ad-
versary proceedings in which ex parte communications are prohib-
ited. The prohibition obviously includes contested cases similar to
court trials. It should also be interpreted to include administrative
proceedings in which conflicting private claims are at issue, even
though the proceeding may formally be classified as rulemaking.
The risk of undue influence is no less in these instances than in a
court trial. For example, the rulemaking procedure is used by the
Federal Communications Commission in distributing television
channels among various communities.8 4 Since this type of distribu-
tion can resolve conflicting private claims to valuable broadcasting
78. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-110(B)
(1971).
79. E.g., H.R. 351, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 10657, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1960); S. 2462, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
80. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.1251 (1973) (FCC may disqualify a participant in a
restricted proceeding who attempts to make an unauthorized ex parte presentation).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 550 et seq. (1974).
82. UNIFORM MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 13.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
84. 47 C.F.R. § 1.572(e) (1973).
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rights, 5 the Code should apply to any ex parte communications made
in such proceedings.
There are a few types of rulemaking proceedings where it is dif-
ficult to decide whether or not ex parte communications should be
banned. Among these are the FCC's proceedings to formulate
policy on cable television and pay-TV. While ex parte communica-
tions in such a proceeding might be beneficial to the agency, any
policy it ultimately would formulate directly affects private groups
which possess an economic interest in the policy. At the very
least, to alleviate any unfair advantage, the agency should make
public the substance of the ex parte communications prior to the
promulgation of a rule so interested groups have an opportunity
to respond. The identity of the person or firm making the ex parte
communication should also be disclosed in situations where it will
not have the effect of losing a valuable informal contact. Disclo-
sure of ex parte communications should also be made in rulemaking
proceedings not involving conflicting private interests because the
communication may aid in understanding and interpreting the rule.
Since most rulemaking does not involve conflicting private
claims, application of the Code to such rulemaking would bar in-
formal contact on the merits of the rule by attorneys representing
industry and interested groups. The expertise of these attorneys and
their clients can assist the agency in formulating sound policy and
working out the details of the rules. Indeed, in recognition of this
expertise, agencies frequently solicit ex parte communications.
Nevertheless, there are certain ex parte communications that
should not be made in any type of rulemaking proceeding. For
instance, an attorney should not relate without prior notification
the activities of a person which are likely to be pivotal to the agency
in deciding whether its regulation will encompass that person's
activities. To illustrate the application of this proposal, suppose
that a pollution control agency is in the process of adopting a regu-
lation setting emission standards for smokestacks. The proposed
regulation does not set any emission standard for substance A.
An attorney for a firm whose smokestack does not emit substance
A informs the agency that X's smokestack emits 50 parts per million
of A without notifying X. As a result of this communication, the
85. See Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221
(D.C. Cir. 1959), on remand, 19 Radio Reg. 1055 (FCC), remanded for new proceed-
ings, 294 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1961). The court required reopening of proceedings
in which a television channel was assigned to a community on grounds that improper
ex parte communications vitiated basic fairness. The assignment affected private
parties with conflicting claims to the channel.
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agency proposes and adopts an emission standard of 2 parts per
million of A. It seems to be commonly assumed that the communi-
cation is not unfair to X as he had an opportunity to comment upon
the merits of the proposal. However, had the agency known that
X's smokestack was emitting only 3 parts per million, it might have
set the standard at that level or decided not to set any standard
because of the low emissions. It might not occur to X to disclose
his emission level in the rulemaking procedure. In a case such as
this, where the communication related to a specific person, the attor-
ney making the comment could have notified X. Even if the agency
informed X of the communication, fairness seems to require that the
communicating attorney, whether he represents a competitor, labor
union, or public interest group, also inform X.
The economically valuable rights awarded in adversary proceed-
ings before administrative agencies provide an incentive for a directly
affected person to exert improper influence on the decisionmakers.
The economic incentive is especially strong when a valuable certif-
icate of public convenience and necessity in the regulated public
utility sector of the economy is at stake. The temptation to exert
improper influence is even greater because the decision between
competing applicants is not based upon adjudicative facts but is
largely discretionary with the agency. For example, in most cases
the Civil Aeronautics Board can justify awarding an airline route to
more than one of the applicants. The Federal Communications
Commission can likewise justify an award of a TV channel to more
than one of the competing groups. It is very difficult for a losing
applicant to obtain reversal of the decision upon judicial review ex-
cept on procedural grounds or application of incorrect legal stan-
dards by the agency. Even if he succeeds in obtaining a reversal,
the case is usually remanded for further proceedings in which the
original successful applicant is likely to win again because the
agency is unshaken in its view that he would be the best operator.
The improper influence problem may have been created by the pos-
sible inappropriateness of administrative proceedings to allocate
economic resources. The inherent nature of the problem suggests
that a better procedure for allocating these economic resources is
possible and should be devised. For example, valuable operating
rights, such as television channels, could be assigned to the highest
bidder in an auction. But whatever specific solution is chosen, it
is clear that something must be done to alleviate the problem as it
exists today.
8 6
86. Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the F.C.C., 50 GEO. L.J. 1, 23
(1961).
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Another illustration of the ineffectiveness of the present Code as
applied to administrative practice is in the area of investigations.
Unlike courts, many administrative agencies conduct investigations.
These can be divided into two categories: regulatory or information-
al. A regulatory investigation may result in criminal prosecution or
civil action being brought for violation of a rule. An informational
investigation may lead to the promulgation of a new regulation,
amendment of an existing regulation, or the introduction of legislation
by the agency.
Regulatory investigation is similar to a grand jury proceeding
in that the agency gathers evidence to determine whether there is
a reasonable basis to believe that a violation has occurred. The
agency may informally interview witnesses and collect information,
or a formal hearing may be held. Because no one is on trial,
witnesses and possible respondents do not have the same rights as
in an adjudicatory hearing. For example, there is generally no
constitutional right to counsel for a person compelled to testify at
an investigatory hearing.87 Because rights are not being adjudi-
cated in regulatory investigations, some modification of the rules
governing conduct for attorneys in adjudication is desirable.
A Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a lawyer from delaying a trial or taking "other action on
behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. 88
But the Code is silent about the use of dilatory tactics by counsel
representing a client being investigated. This problem is less seri-
ous in adjudication before a court than in administrative investiga-
tions because, in an adjudication, the judge exerts some control
over attorneys who use dilatory tactics. This is not the case be-
fore an agency, however, where the investigating agency has less
control. Special rules to curtail the use of dilatory or obstruction-
ist tactics by counsel for persons being investigated by administra-
tive agencies are needed for agencies to carry out effectively their
legislative mandates. Often, counsel for a person being investi-
gated will use such tactics to delay the commencement of a case
against a client or to hinder the agency's effort to change a rule
87. See, e.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) (witness before a state fire
marshall in the investigation of a suspicious fire is not entitled to counsel). How-
ever, the federal Administrative Procedure Act recognizes that a person compelled
to appear before the agency or as a party to the action has a right to counsel. 5
U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970).
88. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIaILITY, Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(1) (1971).
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favorable to his client.8 9 The danger of such tactics being successful
is greater in administrative investigations than in proceedings before
a judge because the investigator usually lacks the stature and experi-
ence implicit in the judicial office. 90 The problem arises frequently
enough to justify the imposition of new rules.
One of the most common obstructionist tactics is for a person
being investigated to refuse to answer questions or comply with a
subpoena or other administrative demand for evidence. As an
agency generally has no power to punish for contempt, it must apply
to a judge for an order directing compliance. Any order issued can
be appealed, so a recalcitrant person may be able to avoid compli-
ance for months or years by testing the order in the courts. One
simple solution would be to give agencies the power to punish for
contempt, but that power often is not exercised wisely by judges
and is much more likely to be abused by agencies pursuing a policy
to which they are emotionally committed. Because the recalcitrant
witness is often advised by counsel at each step, another possible
solution to the problem would be to adopt a disciplinary rule pro-
hibiting the attorney from advising or assisting a person under in-
vestigation in using the procedures available solely for purposes of
delay. This would reduce the effectiveness of using the courts as an
instrument to further dilatory tactics.
The Disciplinary Rule dealing with trial delay is not appropriate
for administrative investigations as there is usually no opposing party
to be harassed or maliciously injured. Accordingly, a disciplinary
rule should be adopted to prohibit obstructionist and dilatory tactics
that are primarily designed to harass the administrative agency or
maliciously prevent it from carrying out its legislative mandate.
Such a rule should also obligate the attorney to withdraw from rep-
resenting a client who engages in such tactics. Whether a particular
tactic is used for dilatory or obstructionist purpose in any given
instance depends largely upon motive. Because the determination of
motive is a subjective inquiry, it is unlikely that any such rule would
be vigorously enforced, but its existence might be a restraining in-
fluence.
In addition to granting agencies the power of contempt or adopt-
ing a new disciplinary rule, a third solution to the problem of delay
would be to encourage the administrative agency to promulgate its
own procedural rules.
89. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm. v. New York Terminal Conference,
373 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1967).
90. See Mead Corp., 62 F.T.C. 1467, 1470 (1963) (real danger of undue delay
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The most serious ethical problem involving counsel in the admin-
istrative rulemaking process is the presentation of erroneous, mis-
leading, or overly selective data to agencies. Before a substantive
rule can be promulgated, it is usually necessary to provide interested
parties with advance notice and an opportunity to present their
views. 91 This opportunity is generally limited to written submis-
sions92 or a short oral statement,93 but occasionally a trial-type
hearing is required.94 In the process, factual information about the
client and the problem which is thought likely to persuade the
agency is frequently presented, and due to the possible benefit
or detriment of the rule to a private party, the potential for misin-
formation increases.
The dimensions of the problem have grown with the general in-
crease in regulation, but the type of information most frequently
misrepresented has shifted towards scientific and technical informa-
tion because of the disproportionate increase in technological regu-
lation. The possibilities for successful misrepresentation of scien-
tific information have increased because neither the agency nor any
member of the public, other than the firms being regulated, usually
has the funds and technical capability to conduct verification tests.
It is not difficult to misrepresent test data through the test design,
the omission of unfavorable data, or the technical misrepresenta-
tion of the data itself. The complexity of technology being regu-
lated makes sophisticated misrepresentation difficult to detect. A
prime example of the problems encountered is the determination
of safety and efficacy of drugs. The results can be distorted by a
slight error in the selection of subjects for a double blind study or
for an attempt to determine the cause of side effects discovered.
A slight change in the side effects discovered can result in a dia-
metrical policy shift for or against a drug. Misrepresentation of
technical matter, however, is not confined to the natural sciences.
Opinion surveys, which are sometimes submitted to agencies, can
also be distorted by improper sample selection or questionnaire
design.
The problem of misrepresentation is especially serious because
in investigatory proceedings caused by witness' counsel taking advantage of the in-
experienced investigator).
91. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
92. E.g., id.
93. See, e.g., UNIFORM MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3
(hearing required upon request of 25 persons).
94. The FDA is required to conduct a trial-type hearing in promulgating stand-
ards of identity for food upon demand of any person adversely affected. 21 U.S.C. §
371(e) (1970).
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the rulemaking proceeding is nonadversary, so that parties who might
take issue with a factual presentation are often not aware it has
even been made. The problem is compounded because factual in-
formation is sometimes presented outside formal rulemaking chan-
nels. It may be presented to a friend in the agency or to a legisla-
tor who has some influence or control over the agency. In contrast
to the view in the not-so-distant past that lobbying by attorneys
was distasteful or reprehensible, 95 it is now fairly well accepted
that counsel may "lobby" for a rule favorable to his client. In fact,
these activities constitute a significant part of the time and energy
of high-powered attorneys engaged in administrative law practice.
Very little effort has been expended to develop standards of
ethics for such practice. Although counsel is prohibited by a disci-
plinary rule from knowingly making a false statement of fact,96
the rule is neither sufficiently strict nor detailed enough to be effec-
tive, in the rulemaking process. Counsel should be held to a higher
standard in the rulemaking process because of the paramount pub-
lic interest in insuring that sound rules are promulgated. The ab-
sence of an adversary increases the attorney's temptation to mis-
represent the facts and to permit omissions to stand unrectified.
Counsel's submission to temptation, coupled with the prevailing at-
titude that it is all right to play fast and easy with the facts in rule-
making, has resulted in considerable factual distortion in these
proceedings. This moral climate may have developed because the
misrepresentation does not affect an individual party but only the
ethereal "public interest."
Any disciplinary rule adopted ought to apply to misleading
omissions of fact as well as false or misleading affirmative state-
ments of fact. The situation in which the attorney has reason to
suspect that a statement may be false or misleading should also be
within the bar. Again, counsel should be obligated to withdraw
from representing a client if the latter makes the misrepresentation
and refuses to correct it. Some allowance must be made for minor
misrepresentation of technical facts by the attorney who is unskilled
in the technical area. However, it is precisely the attorney's lack
of skill which should prompt him to question his client more thor-
oughly in order to discover potential misrepresentation. Such con-
duct should be strongly encouraged by any rules which are adopted.
But the main improvement will have to be made by the agen-
95. See, e.g., Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 335
(1853).
96. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(5) (1971).
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cies. They cannot automatically set aside a rule adopted in reli-
ance upon a misrepresented fact, as can be done in cases of patents
procured through fraud. Unlike a patent, a rule usually affects
parties other than the one who made the misrepresentation. Cer-
tainly, the agency should reconsider the rule in light of the cor-
rected facts. Another needed change is to modify the rulemaking
procedure so that greater reliance is placed upon open hearings
which receive statements from interested persons. Because there
are frequently more interested persons than can be accommodated
in oral hearings, the agencies should publish more of the data and
arguments submitted so that other parties can readily and intelli-
gently respond.
Due to the specialized nature of administrative bodies, each of
the agencies receiving technical data needs its own set of rules
governing the technical data's preparation and submission. It might
seem that agencies would have little control over the submission of
technical data as it is submitted voluntarily. However, an agency
could gain such control by refusing to consider data submitted in
violation of its rules. Without discussing the peculiar rules needed
by a particular agency, the general thrust that should be taken is
readily apparent. For example, a party submitting data should cer-
tify that all of the test results were submitted or state the reason
for any omission. The test procedure used should be specified in
detail unless it is a standard test which is properly identified. The
party should also list other tests on the same issue of which he is
aware, regardless of who conducted them.
Another problem which occurs in administrative practice is the
improper influence exerted by counsel to secure legislators' inter-
vention in investigations, adjudication, or rulemaking. This type of
interference is difficult for agencies to control in the absence of legis-
lation limiting such contact. Agencies are naturally sensitive to the
power the legislative body has over them. More extensive publica-
tion of their contacts might tend to make legislators more circum-
spect and allow adverse parties an opportunity to counteract their
influence. The disclosure approach has a strong appeal in this post-
Watergate era.
It would also seem that some limits could be placed upon con-
tact with a legislator by counsel without seriously impinging upon
the constitutional right of petition. For example, a disciplinary rule
could be adopted prohibiting an attorney from contacting a legisla-
tor during the course of an adjudicative proceeding to ask him to
influence the agency's decision in favor of the attorney's client.97
97. It is unethical for a practitioner before the I.C.C. "[t]o attempt to sway the
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Similarly, contact seeking the discontinuation of an investigation of
the attorney's client should be specifically prohibited. The rule
should not ban an attorney from seeking the legislator's aid in de-
termining the status of a case, however, as this act alone does not
constitute an attempt to influence the decision and agencies are
sometimes exceedingly slow in proceeding with a case. When ad-
ministrative agencies are slow to inform a party of the status of a
case, the legislator performs a valuable and appropriate function by
intervening.
Care should be taken that the contact ban is not extended to
rulemaking except in those cases which affect only the attorney's
client. The desirability of unrestrained comment during the pro-
cess of rulemaking is the same as in the legislative process of in-
vestigation and lawmaking. The more persons with diverse interests
that provide input during the rulemaking process, the greater is the
possibility that erroneous facts and improper influence may be coun-
teracted. In any event, gagging attorneys is likely to produce more
harm by impeding their good faith efforts to prevent agencies from
promulgating rules the attorney genuinely regards as unsound.
It can be argued that it is discriminatory to impose limits
upon attorneys contacting legislators without limiting nonattorneys.
Perhaps this discrimination can be justified because attorneys as a
group seem to be more effective than nonattorneys in persuading
legislators to intervene. Whether or not this reason is sufficient, the
simple realization that attorneys are professionals and should be
held to a higher standard as members of a profession provides a
sufficient justification.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not adequately rec-
ognize the distinction between advocate and counselor.98 Most at-
torneys in administrative law practice spend a large part of their
time in the role of counselor, preparing documents for submission
to an agency and appearing in a representative capacity for a client
in matters not involving litigation. It is especially important
to establish rules governing the counselor because his activities
shape the future while the advocate deals primarily with events
that have already transpired. The counselor's activities are not
checked to the same degree as those of an advocate since the lat-
judgment of the Commission . . .by enlisting the influence or intercession of mem-
bers of Congress." Code of Ethics for Practitioners Before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, Canon 4, reprinted in 49 C.F.R., Subchapter B, App. A, at 212 (1974).
This canon is too general to be of much significance.
98. See, Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEx. L. REv. 575,
578-79 (1961).
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ter's activities are scrutinized by his opponent and subject to judi-
cial control. It was in the attorney's role of counselor in the rule-
making process and in securities practice that the difficult ethical
problems analyzed in this article were encountered.
V. CONCLUSION
It should be clear that there is a need for a new set of ethical
rules especially tailored for administrative law practice. The next
question is who should promulgate the rules. Like the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the rules could be adopted by the
American Bar Association. But because of the noticeable propen-
sity of groups not to engage in rigorous self-regulation, it may be
better if the rules are drafted by a joint committee of the bar and
representatives from administrative agencies.
Alternatively, rules could be drafted by each agency for attor-
neys practicing before it. The trouble with this approach is not only
that it would contribute to the morass of government regulation,
but also that the rules drafted are likely to be very general in na-
ture, based upon rules that have been adopted by agencies to date.99
More importantly, this course of action creates a risk that adminis-
trative agencies might abuse this power by devising and/or applying
rules in a manner which prevents attorneys from opposing agency
policies.
Thus, promulgation of a code of professional responsibility for
administrative law practice can probably best be accomplished by a
joint bar-agency committee. Because the characteristics of each
type of proceeding are similar in all agencies, general rules can be
drafted for each type of proceeding. However, it may be neces-
sary to draft supplementary rules which cover the special features
of particular agencies.
It seems especially appropriate to undertake more self-regulation
of administrative law practice in light of the impact of Watergate
upon the public image of the bar. If the bar does not choose to
regulate administrative law practice more effectively, legislative or
administrative bodies may be tempted to do so without considera-
tion of the bar's viewpoint. The result may be the creation of a
set of rules which overcorrects for past abuses and which serves
the interests of neither the bar nor the public.
99. See, e.g., Code of Ethics for Practitioners Before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, reprinted in 49 C.F.R., Subchapter B, App. A, at 211 (1974).
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